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 Abstract 
 
 
A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and 
private non-profits is the importance of missions, as opposed to profit, as an 
organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by 
motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This paper studies incentives in 
such contexts and emphazises the role of matching principals' and agents' mission 
preferences in increasing organizational efficiency. Matching economizes on the 
need for high-powered incentives. However, it can also entrench bureaucratic 
conservatism and resistance to innovations. The framework developed in this paper 
is applied to school competition, incentives in the public sector and in private non-
profits, and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private 
for-profit sector and the mission-oriented sector through occupational choice.  
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 1 Introduction
The late twentieth century witnessed an historic high in the march of market capitalism with
unbridled optimism in the role of the proﬁt motive in promoting welfare in the production
of private goods. Moreover, this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of
proﬁt-oriented production through privately-owned competitive ﬁrms. When it comes to the
provision of collective goods, no such consensus has emerged.1 Debates about the relative
merits of public and private provision still dominate.
This paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods which cuts
across the traditional public-private divide. It focuses on two key issues: (i) how to structure
incentives and (ii) the role of competition between providers. At its heart is the idea that
organizations for the provision of collective goods cohere around a mission.2 Thus production
of collective goods can be viewed as mission-oriented.
Not all activities within the public-sector are mission-oriented. For example, in some
countries, governments own car plants. While this is part of the public-sector, the optimal
organization design issues here are no diﬀerent than those faced by GM or Ford. Not all
private sector activity is proﬁt-oriented. Universities, whether public or private, have many
goals at variance with proﬁt maximization.
The missions pursued in the provision of collective goods come from the underlying mo-
tivations of the individuals (principals and agents) who work in the mission-oriented sector.
Workers are typically motivated agents, i.e. agents who pursue goals because they perceive
intrinsic beneﬁts from doing so. There are many examples — doctors who are committed to
saving lives, researchers to advancing knowledge, judges to promoting justice and soldiers to
defending their country in battle. Viewing workers as mission-oriented makes sense when the
output of the mission-oriented sector is thought of as producing collective goods. The beneﬁts
and costs generated by mission-oriented production organizations are typically not priced. In
addition, donating one’s income earned in the market is likely to be an imperfect substitute to
1We use the term collective good as opposed to the stricter notion of a public good. Collective goods in this
sense also include merit goods. This label also includes a good like education to which there is a commitment
to collective provision even though the returns are mainly private.
2See, for example, Wilson (1989) on public bureaucracies and Sheehan (1998) on non-proﬁts. Tirole (1994)
is the ﬁrst paper to explore the implications of these ideas for incentive theory.
1joining and working in such an organization in the presence of agency costs or because indi-
viduals care not just about the levels of these collective goods, but their personal involvement
in their production (i.e., a “warm glow”).
The possibility of worker motivation economizes on the need for explicit monetary incentives
while accentuating the importance of non-pecuniary aspects of organization design in increasing
eﬀort. Thus, mission choice can aﬀect the productivity of the organization. For example, a
school curriculum or method of discipline that is agreed to by the whole teaching faculty can
raise school productivity.
However, mission preferences typically diﬀer between motivated agents. Doctors may have
diﬀerent views about the right way to treat ill patients and teachers may prefer to teach to
diﬀerent curriculums. This suggests a role for organizational diversity in promoting alterna-
tive missions and competition between organizations in attracting those whose motivational
preferences best ﬁt with one another. We show that there is direct link between such sorting
and an organization’s productivity.
The insights from the approach have applications to a wide variety of organizations includ-
ing schools, hospitals, universities and armies. The primitives are not whether the organization
is publicly or privately owned but the production technology, the motivations of the actors and
the competitive environment. We also abstract (for the most part) from issues of ﬁnancing.
We benchmark the behavior of the mission-oriented part of the economy against a proﬁt-
oriented sector where standard economic assumptions are made — proﬁt seeking and no non-
pecuniary agent motivation. This is important for two reasons. First, we get a precise contrast
between the incentive structures of proﬁt-oriented and mission-oriented production. Second,
the analysis casts light on how changes in private sector productivity aﬀect optimal incentive
schemes operating in the mission-oriented sector. This has implications for debates about how
pay-setting in public sector bureaucracies responds to the private sector.
Our approach yields useful insights into on-going debates about the organization of the
mission-oriented sector of the economy. For example, it oﬀers new insights into the role of
competition in enhancing productivity in schools. More generally, it suggests that one of the
potential virtues of private non-proﬁt activity is that it can generate a variety of diﬀerent
missions which improve productivity by matching managers and workers who have similar
mission preferences. An analogous argument can be made in support of decentralization of
2public services. However, on the ﬂip side, public bureaucracies, whose policies can be imposed
by politicians, may easily become de-motivated. While matching on mission preferences is
potentially productivity enhancing, it also leads to conservatism and can raise the cost of
organizational change.
This paper contributes to an emerging literature which studies incentive issues outside of
the standard private goods model.3 One strand of this puts weight on the multi-tasking aspects
of non-proﬁt and government production along the lines of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
Another emphasizes the career concerns aspects of bureaucracies (Dewatripont, Jewitt and
Tirole (1999), Alesina and Tabellini (2003)). These two are brought together in Acemoglu,
Kremer and Mian (2003). However, these all work with standard motivational assumptions.
This paper shares in common with Akerlof and Kranton (2003), Benabou and Tirole (2003),
Dixit (2001), Francois (2000), Murdock (2002), and Seabright (2003) the notion that non-
pecuniary aspects of motivation matter.4 I nc o m m o nw i t hC r a w f o r da n dS o b e l( 1 9 8 2 )a n d
Aghion and Tirole (1997) our approach places emphasizes how non-congruence in organiza-
tional objectives can play a role in incentive design. However, we explore the role of matching
principals and agents — selection rather than incentives — as a way to overcome this.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out the
basic model. Section three studies optimal contracts and competition to match principals and
agents. Section four explores applications of the model and section ﬁve concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 The Environment
A“ ﬁrm” consists of a risk neutral principal and an agent who is needed to carry out a project.
The project’s outcome (which can be interpreted as quality) can be high or low: YH =1
(‘high’ or ‘success’) and YL = 0 (‘low’ or ‘failure’). The probability of the high outcome is the
eﬀort supplied by the agent, e, at a cost c(e)=e2/2 . Eﬀort is unobservable and hence non-
3See Dixit (2002) for a survey of this literature.
4Some of these ideas consider the possibility that intrinsic motivation can be aﬀected by the use of explicit
incentives (see also Titmuss (1970), Frey (1997)). We treat the level of intrinsic motivation as given.
5See Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2001), and Lazear (2000) for approaches to
principal agent problems where sorting is important.
3c o n t r a c t i b l e . W ea s s u m et h a tt h ea g e n th a sn ow e a l t hw h i c hc a nb eu s e da sap e r f o r m a n c e
bond in the event of poor performance. Thus, a limited liability constraint operates which
implies that the agent has to be given a minimum consumption level of w ≥ 0 every period.
Because of the limited-liability constraint, the moral hazard problem has bite. This is the only
departure from the ﬁrst-best in our model.
We assume that each principal has suﬃcient wealth so as not to face any binding wealth
constraints, and that the principal and agent can obtain an autarchy payoﬀ of zero.
There are two sectors in the economy. A proﬁt-oriented sector produces a good or ser-
vice that does not generate non-pecuniary beneﬁts to those who work in it — for example,
investment banking. A mission-oriented sector produces a good or service that may generate
non-pecuniary beneﬁts to the principals and agents who produce it — for example, education.
The sets of types of principals and agents are denoted by Ap and Aa with typical elements
pk and aj. Each has cardinality M +1 , i.e., there are M +1t y p e so fp r i n c i p a l sa n da g e n t s .
Of these the types 1,...,M are motivated. They receive some non-pecuniary beneﬁts if they
work in the mission-oriented sector. Type M + 1 denotes unmotivated principals or agents.
They have the standard principal-agent preferences. A principal has some special skill that
makes him productive in any one of the two sectors only. In particular, motivated principals
(types 1,2,..,M) are productive in the mission-oriented sector and unmotivated principals
(type M + 1) are productive in the proﬁt-oriented sector. However, each type of agent is
equally productive in both sectors — the only diﬀerence is in the size of the non-pecuniary
beneﬁt that they derive from working in the mission-oriented sector.6 The types of principals
and agents are fully observed.
If an agent of type aj (j =1 ,2,..,M,M + 1) matches with a principal of type pk (k =
1,2,..,M,M +1), then if the project is a success they receive a (pre-contractual) payoﬀ of θa
jk
and θ
p
kj respectively. The principal and the agent receive a payoﬀ of zero if the project fails.
If a motivated agent of type aj (j =1 ,2,..,M) matches with a motivated principal of type
pk (k =1 ,2,..,M), these payoﬀs from success depend on x ∈ <, w h i c hi st h e“ m i s s i o n ”o ft h e
organization and will be denoted by θa
jk(x)a n dθ
p
kj(x) in this case. The mission x is chosen by
6This is a simplifying assumption. We can allow each type of principal to work in either one of the two
sectors without aﬀecting the main results qualitatively. In that case their equilibrium occupational choice would
depend on the extent of the non-pecuniary beneﬁts they receive in the mission-oriented sector, and the supply
of agents of diﬀerent types.
4the principal and is contractible, i.e., the principal can commit to it at the time of signing the
contract. We will work with the following simple form of preferences for motivated principals
and agents when they match with one another:
θ
p
kj (x)=ωp{1 −
1
2
(αk − x)
2} (1)
θa
jk(x)=ωa{1 −
1
2
(αj − x)
2} (2)
for k =1 ,2,..,M and j =1 ,2,..,M, where αk,αj ∈ [α,α]w i t h0≤ α < α, ωa ≥ 0, and
ωp > 0.7 E a c hm o t i v a t e dp r i n c i p a la n da g e n th a sa ni d e a lm i s s i o na sr e p r e s e n t e db yα.L e t
¯ ∆ =¯ α − α be a measure of mission preference diversity in the whole population. The agent’s
payoﬀ if he is matched with a motivated principal is entirely non-pecuniary.8 However, the
principal’s payoﬀ could arise (partially or wholly) from selling the output in the market. We
make:
Assumption 1:
ωa + ωp < 1 and ¯ ∆2 < 2.
These ensure that θ
p
kj (x) > 0, θa
jk(x) > 0f o rx between ¯ α and α and θ
p
kj (x)+θa
jk(x) < 1,
which we will see later, ensures an interior solution for eﬀort in the mission-oriented sector.
An unmotivated principal (type pM+1) receives a monetary payoﬀ:
θ
p
M+1j = π for all j =1 ,2,..,M,M +1
from operating in the proﬁt-oriented sector if the project is successful irrespective to the type
of the agent he is matched with. If a motivated principal (type pk,k=1 ,2,..,M)i sm a t c h e d
with an unmotivated agent (type aM+1), for a given value of x his payoﬀ is the same as what
he would receive if he was matched with a motivated agent, as given by (1). This reﬂects the
assumption that there is no diﬀerence in the abilities of diﬀerent types of agents, whether they
work in the proﬁt-oriented sector or the mission-oriented sector.
An unmotivated agent receives no non-pecuniary payoﬀ,i . e . , θa
M+1j (x) = 0 for all j =
1,2,..,M +1 irrespective of which principal he is matched with. If a motivated agent works in
7Thus, in this case pk = αk and aj = αj for j,k =1 ,...,M.
8These payoﬀs are contractible, unlike in Hart and Holmstrom (2002) where non-contractibility of private
beneﬁts plays an important role. Also, these are independent of monetary incentives, which is contrary to the
a s s u m p t i o ni nt h eb e h a v i o r a le c o n o m i c sl i t e r a t u r e( s e eF r e y ,1 9 9 7 ) .
5the proﬁt-oriented sector (or, equivalently, for an unmotivated principal) then he too receives
no non-pecuniary payoﬀ,i . e . ,
θa
jM+1 (x)=0f o rj =1 ,2,..,M.
The population of types 1,...,M is assumed to be balanced in the sense that there are equal
numbers of every type in the population. Let n`
m (` ∈ {a,p}) be the number of principals and
agents of each type. We assume that na
m = np
m for all m ≤ M, i.e., the population of
motivated principals and agents is balanced. However, in the unmotivated sector we allow for
both unemployment, i.e., na
M+1 >n
p
M+1, and full employment,i . e . ,na
M+1 <n
p
M+1.
We assume that π is high enough so that unmotivated principals can generate positive
surplus despite the presence of moral hazard:
Assumption 2:
1
4
π2 − w > 0.
An analogous assumption is made regarding the mission-oriented sector:
Assumption 3:
1
2
ωaωp >wfor all ωa > ωp
1
8
(ωa + ωp)
2 >wfor all ωa ≤ ωp.
These conditions are satisﬁed for high values of ωa and/or ωp and low values of w.
When the mission-oriented and proﬁt-oriented sectors compete for agents, our ﬁnal as-
sumption ensures that mission-oriented production is viable9:
Assumption 4:
ωa + ωp ≥ π.
Discussion: In our formulation, the payoﬀs θ
p
kj and θa
jk of motivated principals and agents
(so long a motivated agent is not matched with an unmotivated principal) depend on two
9Combined with Assumption 1, this assumption also guarantees an interior solution for eﬀort in the proﬁt-
oriented sector.
6sets of taste-parameters. These relate to motivation (ωp and ωa)a n dmission-preference (αk
and αj). Motivation is a measure of warm-glow: for example, how much the principal or the
agent cares about successfully running a school or a patient’s health. The deviation of actual
mission choice from their preferred mission choice however dampens the motivations of the
principal and the agent to some degree. For example, the principal might prefer an emphasis
o nr e l i g i o ni nt h es y l l a b u s ,w h e r e a st h et e a c h e rm i g h tp r e f e ra ne m p h a s i so ns c i e n c e .I nt h i s
set up missions are rather like ideologies — there is an underlying conﬂict in the preferences of
diﬀerent types about how the organization should be oriented.
A “mission” consists of attributes of a project that make people value its success over
and above any monetary income they receive in the process. As mentioned earlier, these
attributes are assumed to have missing markets, and in addition, this non-monetary valuation
is contingent on the direct participation of the principal and the agent. In our theoretical model
we make no distinction between the “private” (or for-proﬁt) and “public” (or non-proﬁt) sectors
as both could have ﬁrms that have mission-driven managers and workers. However, most of
our applications are from the public sector and the private non-proﬁts e c t o r .
Take the example of a school. The principal is a school principal (head teacher) with
responsibility for running a school. The agent is the teacher whom he employs. The project
is the performance of the students. If there is a market for education, then eθ
p
kj may in part
reﬂect the expected revenue of the principal by providing high quality education. Some of the
teachers are partly motivated towards educational success. The mission of the organization
is the teaching curriculum (which can vary in terms of, say, the importance of religion). The
teachers have the ability to work in the ﬁnancial sector, but then they receive no non-pecuniary
beneﬁts from the job. An unmotivated agent has the ability to teach, but receives no non-
pecuniary beneﬁts. Other examples of mission-oriented sectors include hospitals, religious
organizations, the army, non-governmental organizations carrying out relief and development
w o r k ,a sw e l la st e r r o r i s to r g a n i z a t i o n ss u c ha sA lQ a e d a .
2.2 Contracts and Matching
The agent’s reward can be conditioned on the outcome of the project. Thus, a contract is a
vector c = {e,w,b,x} where e is eﬀort, w is the ﬁxed wage level, b is a bonus payment for
7a successful project, and x is a mission.10 The contract is feasible i fa n do n l yi fi ts a t i s ﬁes
three conditions — (i) it respects the agent’s limited liability constraint, (ii) the eﬀort level is
incentive-compatible (iii) the principal and agent both get a non-negative expected payoﬀ.L e t
C (pk,a j) be the set of feasible contracts for the pair (pk,a j), and let v
p
k (c)a n dva
j (c)b et h e
principal’s and agent’s expected payoﬀsf o rc ∈ C (pk,a j). Let
max
c∈C(pk,aj)
³
va
j (c)
´
≡ va
jk
be the maximum feasible payoﬀ that an agent of type aj c a no b t a i nw h e nc o n t r a c t i n gw i t ha
principal of type pk. Later we show that our assumptions ensure that va
jk is a strictly positive
real number and so C (pk,a j) is non-empty for every principal agent pair.
Contracts are determined by matched principal and agent pairs. Following Roth and
Sotomayor (1989), the matching process can summarized by a one-to-one matching function
µ : Ap ∪Aa → Ap ∪ Aa such that (i) µ(pk) ∈ Aa ∪ {pk} for all pk ∈ Ap (ii) µ(aj) ∈ Ap ∪ {aj}
for all aj ∈ Aa and (iii) µ(pk)=aj if and only if µ(aj)=pk for all (pk,a j) ∈ Ap ×A a.A
principal (agent) is unmatched if µ(pk)=pk (µ(aj)=aj). What this function does is to assign
each principal (agent) to at most one agent (principal) and allows for the possibility that a
principal (agent) remains unmatched, in which case he is described as “matched to himself”.
An allocation for our economy is a matching described by µ a n das e to fc o n t r a c t sc ∈
C (µ(aj),a j) for all αj ∈ Ap. We are interested in the properties of allocations that are optimal
in two senses. First, principals are optimizing in the contracts that they oﬀer to agents and,
second, no pair of principals and agents could rematch and make themselves (strictly) better
oﬀ.
Let u(aj):Aa → [0,va
jk] describe a vector of (feasible) “reservation payoﬀs” for each agent
aj who is matched with a principal pk.I fa na g e n taj is matched with himself then u(aj)=0 .
An optimal contract will solve:
max
c∈C(pk,aj)
v
p
k (c)
subject to (3)
va
j (c) ≥ u(aj)
10We are following the convention that e is part of the optimal contract so long as it satisﬁes the incentive-
compatibility constraint.
8with the latter being the participation constraint of the agent. As we will see below, if u(aj)
is too small, the participation constraint will not bind. Denote the solution to the above
contracting problem by c∗ (pk,a j). By varying u(aj) over the suitable interval, this program
allows us to solve for the (constrained) Pareto-frontier for any principal-agent match.
A matching µ, with an associated set of optimal contracts {c∗ (µ(aj),a j)}aj∈Aa(or equiv-
alently, {c∗ (pk,µ(pk))}pk∈Ap)i sstable if and only if there is no pair (pk,a j)a n d f e a s i b l e
contract c ∈ C (pk,a j)s u c ht h a t :
v
p
k (c) >v
p
k (c∗ (pk,µ(pk)))
and
va
j (c) >v a
j (c∗ (µ(aj),a j)).
Intuitively, there is no principal-agent pair who would prefer to be matched with someone else
other than their designated match. It follows immediately from the deﬁnition of stability that
under a stable matching all matched allocations are Pareto eﬃcient. Otherwise, principals
and agents could re-match and at least one principal-agent pair would be better oﬀ.
3A n a l y s i s
We ﬁrst solve for optimal contracts for a given match of a principal of type pk and an agent of
type aj. We then study the implications of stable matching.
3.1 Optimal Contracts
The optimal contract solves:
max
c v
p
k = θ
p
kj (x)e − {eb + w} (4)
subject to:
(i) The limited liability constraint (LLC) requiring that the agent be left with at least w:
b + w ≥ w,w≥ w (5)
(ii) The participation constraint (PC)o ft h ea g e n tt h a t :
va
j = e
³
b + θa
jk(x)
´
+ w −
1
2
e2 ≥ u(aj)( 6 )
9(iii) The incentive-compatibility constraint (ICC) which stipulates that the eﬀort level
maximizes the agent’s private payoﬀ given (b,w,x)s i n c ee is not observable:
e =a r gm a x
e∈[0,1]
µ
e
³
b + θa
jk(x)
´
+ w −
1
2
e2
¶
. (7)
Observe that b can never exceed θ
p
kj(x) because the principal will then be receiving a negative
expected payoﬀ which is inconsistent with c being a feasible contract. Similarly, it is not
eﬃcient to set b<0( t h eLLC requires that b + l ≥ w a n ds ot h i si sf e a s i b l eo n l yi fw>w )
since by increasing b and decreasing w to keep the agent’s utility constant, eﬀort would go up
and the principal would be better oﬀ. Therefore, the ICC can be rewritten as:
e = b + θa
jk(x) ∈ (0,1). (8)
The solution to the above program divides into three sub-cases depending upon which of
the above constraints bind. To state the results that follow, it is useful to deﬁne
ˆ θjk(x)=m a x {θa
jk(x),θ
p
kj (x)} + θa
jk(x).
Then, the following Proposition characterizes t h eo p t i m a lc o n t r a c ti nt h em i s s i o n - o r i e n t e d
sector. All proofs are presented in the Appendix:
Proposition 1: An optimal contract (e∗
jk,b ∗
jk,w ∗
jk,x ∗
jk) between the principal and agent pair
(pk,a j) ∈ Ap ∪ Aa given a reservation payoﬀ u(aj) ∈
h
0,¯ va
jk
i
exists, and has the following
features:
(i) The ﬁxed payment is set at the subsistence level, i.e., w∗
jk = w
(ii) The bonus payment is characterized by
b∗
jk =m a x
nq
2ψjk − θa
jk(x∗
jk),0
o
where ψjk =m a x
n
u(aj) − w, 1
8(ˆ θjk(x∗
jk))2
o
.
(iii) The optimal eﬀort level solves: e∗
jk = b∗
jk + θa
jk(x∗
jk).
(iv) The optimal mission is as follows: if ωa > ωp then x∗
jk =
αj+αk
2 while if ωa ≤ ωp,
then x∗
jk =
ωaαj+ωpαk
ωa+ωp .
There are four main components of the contract. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o p o s i t i o ns h o w s
that the ﬁxed wage payment is set as low as possible. This is intuitive: other than the agent’s
10minimum consumption constraint, the agent is risk-neutral and does not care about the spread
between his income in the two states. From the principal’s point of view it is best to minimize
w, since it has no eﬀect on eﬀort choice.
The second part characterizes the optimal bonus payment. There are three cases depending
on which of the constraints in the optimal contracting problem is binding and whether or the
principal or the agent values the outcome more:
Case 1: If the agent is more motivated than the principal and the outside option is low, then
b∗
jk =0 , i.e., there should optimally be no incentive pay.
Case 2: If the principal is more motivated than the agent and the outside option is low, then
b∗
jk =
1
2
³
θ
p
kj(x∗
jk) − θa
jk(x∗
jk)
´
.
In this case, the principal sets incentive pay equal to half the diﬀerence in the principal and
agent’s valuation of success.
Case 3: If the outside option is high then
b∗
jk =
q
2(u(aj) − w) − θa
jk(x∗
jk).
The optimal incentive pay, in this case, is set by the outside market with a discount which
depends on the agent’s motivation.
The third part of Proposition 1 gives the eﬀort level. If eﬀort were contractible, then
it would be set equal to θ
p
kj(x)+θa
jk(x). The principal can attain this, by setting the bonus
payment equal to θ
p
kj(x). However, this will not maximize his expected payoﬀ — he faces the
usual trade-oﬀ between rent-extraction and incentive provision.
The last part of the Proposition characterizes the optimal mission choice. A simple trade-
oﬀ shapes the optimal mission. A mission closer to the agent’s preferred outcome increases
eﬀort and hence allows the principal to oﬀer a lower bonus payment. However, by moving the
mission in this direction, the principal makes the project less valuable to himself. The result
is typically a weighted average of the principal and agent’s ideal missions, with the greater a
party’s motivation, the closer the chosen mission being to his ideal mission. However, if the
agent is more motivated than the principal, then the principal would like to extract some of the
agent’s “excess” motivation by reducing the bonus payment, even though that would reduce
11eﬀort. But the bonus is already zero in this case, and cannot be reduced any further due to
limited liability. Therefore, the principal will partly increase his payoﬀ by choosing a mission
that is closer to his own preferred mission than what the weighted average formula suggests,
although that reduces eﬀort to some degree.
We now oﬀer three corollaries of this proposition which are useful to understanding its
implications for incentive design. The ﬁrst describes what happens in the proﬁt-oriented sector.
Corollary 1: An optimal contract (e∗,b ∗,w ∗) in the proﬁt-oriented sector for an agent of
type aj (j =1 ,2,...,M +1)whose reservation payoﬀ is u(aj) ∈
h
0, ¯ va
jM+1
i
exists, and has the
following features:
(i) The ﬁxed payment is set at the subsistence level, i.e., w∗ = w
(ii) The bonus payment is characterized by
b∗ =
q
2ψjM+1
where ψjM+1 =m a x
n
u(aj) − w, 1
8π2
o
.
(iii) The optimal eﬀort level solves: e∗ = b∗.
A formal proof is in the appendix. But basically, it follows from Proposition 1 after plugging
in θ
p
M+1j = π and θa
jM+1 = 0 (for all j =1 ,2,..,M+ 1). Mission choice is no longer an issue.
Moreover, case 1 above (bureaucratic incentives) is no longer a possibility — the agent in the
proﬁt oriented sector must always be oﬀered incentive pay to put in eﬀort.
Corollary 2: Greater principal-agent heterogeneity on missions reduces organizational eﬃ-
ciency.
Let ∆(pk,a j) ≡ |αk − αj| denote the extent of divergence in the principal’s and agent’s
preferred mission.11 Note that the equilibrium eﬀort level in cases 1 and 2 above is decreasing
in ∆(pk,a j). Hence, organizations where agents and principals agree on mission preferences
will have higher levels of productivity.
Corollary 3: Cross-sectionally, bonus payments and eﬀort are negatively correlated.
11In case 1, e
∗
jk = ωa
¡
1 −
1
8 [∆(pk,a j)]
2¢
, w h i l ei nc a s e2 ,e
∗
jk =
1
2
n
(ωp + ωa) −
1
2
ωpωa
ωp+ωa (∆(pk,a j))
2
o
.
12To see this, observe that the bonus paid to the agent is decreasing in his motivation and is
zero if the agent is more motivated than the principal. Moreover, the bonus is increasing in
∆(pk,a j).12 This, combined with Corollary 2, implies the striking result that productivity
(i.e., equilibrium eﬀort) and incentive pay will be (weakly) negatively correlated across orga-
nizations. This is a pure selection eﬀect capturing the characteristics of agents that aﬀects
both eﬀort and incentive payments. Holding the characteristics of the principals and the agent
constant, greater incentive pay would lead to higher eﬀort and higher productivity.
The observation that productivity decreases in ∆(pk,a j) motivates the role of competition
between principals in hiring agents as a means of raising organizational productivity. Both
principals and agents can gain by improving sorting. In the next section, we explore this
formally.
3.2 Competition
We now consider what happens when the sectors compete for agents. However, we do so with-
out modeling the competitive process explicitly. We focus instead directly on the implications
of stable matching. This says that any reasonable matching between principals and agents
must be immune to a deviation in which any principal and agent can negotiate a contract
which makes both of them strictly better oﬀ compared to the existing situation. Were this
not the case then we would expect rematching to occur. We begin by showing that any stable
matching must have agents in the mission-oriented sector matched with principals of the same
t y p e .T h i si ss t a t e da s :
Proposition 2: Consider a matching µ and associated optimal contracts {c∗ (µ(aj),a j)}
M
j=1.
Then this matching is stable only if ∆(µ(aj),a j)=0for all j =1 ,..,M.
This result says that all stable matches must have motivated principals and agents matched
with one another. This argument is a consequence of the fact that, for any ﬁxed set of
reservation payoﬀs, an assortatively matched principal agent pair can always generate more
12For example, in case 2, b
∗ (pk,a j)=
1
2(θp − θa)=
1
2 (ωp − ωa)
½
1+
1
2
ωpωa
(ωp+ωa)
2 (∆(pk,a j))
2
¾
. Both θa and
θp fall when ∆(pk,a j)g o e su p ,b u ti nt h i sc a s eθa falls relatively more as x is already closer to the ideal mission
preference of the principal.
13surplus than one where the principal and agent are of diﬀerent types.13
This result allows us to focus on assortative matching. However, it leaves open the question
of whether stable matches exist. We now construct two cases of stable matches which are
economically interesting. The ﬁrst arises when there is full-employment in the proﬁt-oriented
sector and the second when there is unemployment. We illustrate a stable matching in each
case.
In the full employment case, the principals compete for agents who are scarce so that the
latter can capture all the surplus in any stable outcome — otherwise an unmatched principal
could “bid” for an agent who is matched with another principal by oﬀering him a better
contract. This sets a ﬂoor on the payoﬀ that a motivated agent can be paid. Whether the
voluntary participation constraint is binding now depends on how π compares with ωa and ωp.
Let
ˆ ω =m a x {ωa,ωp} + ωa.
Then we have a stable matching for this case as follows:
Proposition 3: Suppose that na
M+1 <n
p
M+1 (full employment in the proﬁt-oriented sector).
Then the following matching µ is stable:
(i) ∆(µ(aj),a j)=0for all j =1 ,..,M and µ(aM+1)=pM+1.
(ii) w∗ (µ(aj),a j)=w for all j =1 ,...,M +1
(iii) The bonus payment in the mission-oriented sector is:
b∗ (µ(aj),a j)=
1
2
max
½
ˆ ω,π +
q
π2 − 4w
¾
− ωa
for all j =1 ,...,M.
(iv) The bonus payment in the proﬁto r i e n t e ds e c t o ri s :
b∗ (µ(aM+1),a M+1)=
π +
p
π2 − 4w
2
.
Thus the stable matching outcome has perfect sorting on motivation — motivated principals
and agents are matched on mission preferences and the unmotivated principals are matched
13Recent results on assortative matching in non-transferable utility environments by Legros and Newman
(2003) cannot be applied here because of the speciﬁc nature of the preferences over missions. See Appendix B
for further discussion.
14with the unmotivated agents. Such pairings yield the highest (second-best) surplus for the
relevant principals and agents which makes other matches unstable. With full employment
in the proﬁt-oriented sector, the expected payoﬀ o fu n m o t i v a t e dp r i n c i p a l si sd r i v e nd o w nt o
zero and unmotivated agents capture all the surplus from proﬁt-oriented production. In the
situation described in proposition 3, the reservation utility of a motivated agent is set by what
he could obtain by switching to the mission-oriented sector.14
Comparing Propositions 1 and 3, two roles of competition can be seen. First, there
is a matching eﬀect whereby smaller values of ∆(pk,a j) boosts organizational productiv-
ity and economizes on the need for incentive pay in the mission-oriented sector. Second,
there is an outside option eﬀect —i ft h ep r o ﬁt-oriented sector is suﬃciently productive (i.e.,
π +
p
π2 − 4w > ˆ ω + ωa) then the mission-oriented sector the participation constraint will
bind, increasing pay and an agent’s productivity.
This matched outcome gives an exact sense of when incentives will be less high-powered in
mission-oriented production with motivated agents. When the participation constraint binds
in the mission-oriented sector, incentive pay is at the private sector level less ωa. Without the
participation constraint binding, incentive pay in the mission-oriented sector is zero if ωa > ωp,
and so once again, incentives is more high powered in the proﬁt-oriented sector. However, it
is possible to have more high-powered incentives in mission-oriented sector than in the proﬁt-
oriented sector. This is when the participation constraint is not binding, and ωp is very high
relative to π and ωa.
If there is unemployment in the proﬁt-oriented sector, an unmotivated principal should
be able to extract all the surplus from this agent (at least in so far as the limited liability
constraint permits). This implies that the supply price of motivated agents is determined by
their unemployment payoﬀ. For this case, we have the following example:
Proposition 4: Suppose that na
M+1 >n
p
M+1 (unemployment in the proﬁt-oriented sector).
Then the following matching µ is stable:
(i) ∆(µ(aj),a j)=0for all j =1 ,..,M and µ(pM+1)=aM+1.
14While we have picked this solution to show why payoﬀsi nt h ep r o ﬁt-oriented and mission-oriented sector
can be tied together, there is in fact a range of reservation utilities for motivated agents which support an
equilibrium with assortative matching. The situation that we are describing in Proposition 3, is that stable
outcome which gives most surplus to the motivated principals.
15(ii) w∗ (µ(aj),a j)=w for all j =1 ,...,M +1
(iii) The bonus payment in the mission-oriented sector is
b∗ (µ(aj),a j)=
1
2
ˆ ω − ωa
for all j =1 ,...,M and the bonus payment in the proﬁt oriented sector is
b∗ (µ(aM+1),a M+1)=
π
2
.
This result diﬀers in a couple of interesting ways from Proposition 3 although the thrust
of the argument is preserved, namely, stable outcomes involve matching motivated principals
and agents on similarity of mission preferences, and matching unmotivated principals with
unmotivated agents. The presence of unemployment unhinges incentives in the mission-
oriented and proﬁt-oriented sectors of the economy since the only outside option is being
unemployed. Principals and employed agents in both sectors earn a rent.
4 Applications
Contrasting the results in Proposition 1 with those in Propositions 2, 3 and 4 yields some
insight into the role of competition in the mission-oriented sector and its role in improving
productivity and changing incentives. The results in Propositions 2, 3 and 4 correspond to
an idealized situation of frictionless matching. They provide a benchmark for what can be
achieved with decentralized provision where principals have autonomy over mission choice.
So long as all principals and agents in the mission-oriented sector have the same levels of
motivation (ωp and ωa) in equilibrium all agents get the same compensation package and the
productivity of each ﬁrm is the same, even though they diﬀer in terms of missions. The results
also emphasize how matching can increase organizational eﬃciency with limited use of high
powered incentives. For the purposes of applications, Propositions 2, 3 and 4 correspond to
a case where frictions are small or the outcome in the long-run.
Reality can diverge from this ideal in two main ways. In some cases (especially where
mission-oriented production is public), the principal may be restricted in the mission that he
can adopt. Some ﬁrms may therefore be unable to adapt the mission to suit agent’s mission
preferences. For example, constitutional restrictions in the U.S. do not allow public funding
16of religious organizations even though there may be many teachers who would be motivated by
teaching to a religious curriculum. The model predicts that this leads to a loss of productivity.
Another source of divergence is the presence of natural and artiﬁcial frictions to matching
implying that our idealized matching outcome may not be realized. If this is the case, then
ﬁrms within the mission-oriented sector will diﬀer not only in terms of the mission, but also
in terms of the contracts, and levels of productivity. The results in Proposition 1 hold for
an any optimal contract — including those where principals and agents are not matched on
mission preferences. They emphasize how poor alignment of principals and agents in terms
of mission-preference lead to a greater need for monetary incentives. Thus, Proposition 1
provides a benchmark for cases where matching is poor. For the purposes of applications we
will interpret this as a case where either market frictions are large, or possibly a “short-run”
analysis where matches can be taken as ﬁxed.
The results in Propositions 3 and 4 also give some sense of the link between the contracts
oﬀered in the mission-oriented sector and those oﬀered in the proﬁt-oriented sector. For some
applications, this is important.
4.1 School Competition
The approach generates insights into the role of competition in fostering improved school
performance. The overview in Hoxby (2003) conﬁrms that relatively little theoretical work has
been done on determinants of school productivity even though the empirical literature suggests
that there are productivity diﬀerences across schools and that competition may aﬀect these.15
The competitive outcome that we characterize can be thought of as the outcome from
an idealized system of decentralized schooling in which schools compete by picking diﬀerent
kinds of curriculum and attracting teachers who are most motivated to teach according to
that curriculum. One element of the curriculum could, for example, be whether religious
instruction is included. Well matched schools can forego incentive pay and rely exclusively on
agents’ motivation. This explains why some schools (such as Catholic schools) can be more
15Hoxby (1999) is a key exception. She models the impact of competition in a model where there are rents
in the market for schools, and argues that a Tiebout like mechanism may increase school productivity. Other
approaches to the issue, such as Epple and Romano (2002), have emphasized peer-group eﬀects (i.e., school
quality depends on the quality of the mean student) but as far as “supply side” factors are concerned they
assume that some schools are more productive than others for exogenous reasons.
17productive by attracting teachers whose mission-preferences are closely aligned with those of
the school management. More generally, a decentralized schooling system where missions are
developed at the school level will tend to be more productive (as measured in our model by
equilibrium eﬀort) than a centralized one in which a uniform curriculum (mission) is imposed
on schools by government.
The approach oﬀered here is distinct from existing theoretical links competition and produc-
tivity in the context of schools. For example, yardstick competition has been used extensively
in the U.K. where “league tables” are used to compare school performance. Whether such
competition is welfare improving in the context of schools is moot since the theoretical case
for yardstick comparisons is suspect when the incentives in organizations are vague or implicit
as in the case of schools (see, for example, Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999)). Another
possible paradigm for welfare-improving school competition rests on the possibility that it can
increase the threat of liquidation with a positive eﬀect on teacher eﬀort (Schmidt, 1997). This
possibility could easily be incorporated into our model as a force that increases the cost to the
agent (in this case a teacher) of the outcome where the output is YL.
These diﬀerent roles of competition can be studied in our contracting framework without
the implausible assumption of proﬁt maximization as the school objective. Moreover, the
model works equally well for publicly owned and privately owned schools.16 It also suggests a
novel mechanism by which voucher competition can enhance school productivity by allowing
parents to ﬁnd the school with the best match between their curriculum needs (parents’ mission
preferences) and schools.
The model abstracts from stratiﬁcation due to principal and agents diﬀering in their mo-
tivation by considering matching only in terms of mission preferences. As a result, in the
decentralized equilibrium of our model, all schools are equally productive even though they
are diﬀerentiated by mission. The analysis can be extended to allow principals and agents to
diﬀer in their motivation levels (diﬀerent ω’s). Appendix B shows that we have assortative
matching in this case. More motivated agents receive higher bonus payments. The outcome
now involves inequality within the mission-oriented sector in terms of payoﬀs and expected
16The model is relevant for the kinds of quasi-markets reforms encouraing competition within the public
sector. These have been experimented with extensively in the U.K. (see, for example, Legrand and Bartlett
(1993))
18output. Competition between schools will then lead to segregation eﬀects, emphasized by
authors such as Epple and Romano (2002).
Diversity in missions can, in some cases, generate negative externalities. This is particularly
so when missions are likely to be driven by ideology, religious or political, and one concern with
horizontally diﬀerentiated schools could be that society could end up being very fragmented
with a negative consequence for the solution of collective action problems. This could lead to
reasons why the state would wish to restrict the missions adopted by schools.
4.2 Nonproﬁt Organizations
The notion of a mission-oriented organization staﬀed by motivated agents corresponds well to
many views of non-proﬁt organizations. The model emphasizes why those who care about a
particular cause are likely to end up as employees in mission-oriented non-proﬁts. This ﬁnds
support in Weisbrod (1988), who observes that “Non-proﬁto r g a n i z a t i o n sm a ya c td i ﬀerently
from private ﬁrms not only because of the constraint on distributing proﬁt but also, perhaps,
because the motivations and goals of managers and directors ... diﬀer. If some non-proﬁts
attract managers whose goals are diﬀerent from those managers in the proprietary sector, the
two types of organizations will behave diﬀerently.” (page 31). He also observes that “Managers
will ... sort themselves, each gravitating to the types of organizations that he or she ﬁnds least
restrictive — most compatible with his or her personal preferences” (page 32).17
Weisbrod also cites persuasive evidence to support the idea that such sorting is impor-
tant in practice in the non-proﬁt sector. However, the discussion in Weisbrod (1988)) overly
emphasizes the role of the non-proﬁt constraint rather than the more primitive notion of
mission-orientation. Militant organizations such as Al Qaeda, the Irish Republican Army, or
Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path) are able to sort workers on mission preferences
without necessarily using anything like a non-proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t . 18 We also regard such sorting
as important in “socially responsible” for-proﬁt ﬁr m ss u c ha st h eB o d yS h o p . 19 How exactly a
17See Glaeser (2002) for a model of non-proﬁts where workers and managers of non-proﬁts have something
like our mission-preferences, i.e., caring directly about the output of the ﬁrm.
18For instance, it is often alleged that some militant organizations fund their operations using proﬁts from
drug-traﬃcking (see, for example, the website of The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Aﬀairs (INL), http://www.state.gov/g/inl/).
19On the website of the Body Shop, their “values” are described as follows: “We consider testing prod-
19non-proﬁt status facilitates greater sorting on missions, or a commitment to corporate respon-
sibility by for-proﬁt ﬁrms enhances eﬃciency (even though some of these measures, like in the
case of the Body Shop might be costly) by attracting a motivated workforce raise interesting
questions and are explored in depth in Besley and Ghatak (2003).
Empirical studies suggest that in industries where both for-proﬁts and non-proﬁts are in
operation, such as hospitals, the former sector make signiﬁcantly higher use of performance-
based bonus compensation relative to base salary for managers (Ballou and Weisbrod, 2002 and
Bertrand, Hallock, and Arnould 2003). It is recognized in the literature that managers may care
about the outputs produced by the hospital or the patient. However, researchers are unable
to explain this empirical ﬁnding. In the words of Ballou and Weisbrod (2002): “While the
compensating diﬀerentials may explain why levels of compensation diﬀer across organizational
forms, it does not explain the diﬀerentials in the use of strong relative to weak incentives.”
Our framework provides a simple explanation for this ﬁnding. In addition, Bertrand, Hallock,
and Arnould (2003) ﬁnd that the spread of managed care in the US, which increases market
competition, induced signiﬁcant changes in the behavior of non-proﬁt hospitals. In particular,
although the relationship between economic performance and top managerial pay in nonproﬁt
hospitals is on average weak, they found that it strengthens with increases in HMO penetration.
In terms of our model, this can be explained as the eﬀect of an increase in the proﬁtability of
the for-proﬁts e c t o r( π) which tightens the participation constraints of the managers.
Our framework also underlines the value of diversity in the mission-oriented sector provided
that there are variety of views in the way in which public goods should be produced (as
represented by the mission preferences). Weisbrod (1988) emphasizes the important of non-
proﬁt organizations in achieving diversity in the provision of collective goods. He observes
that non-proﬁts will likely play a more important role in situations where there is greater
underlying diversity in preferences for collective goods. For example, he contrasts the U.S.
and Japan suggesting that greater cultural heterogeneity of the U.S. is partly responsible for the
greater importance of non-proﬁt activity in the U.S.. Our analysis of the role of competition in
sorting principals and agents on mission preferences underpins the role of diversity in achieving
ucts or ingredients on animals to be morally and scientiﬁcally indefensible” and “We believe that a busi-
ness has the responsibility to protect the environment in which it operates, locally and globally” (see
http://www.thebodyshop.com/).
20eﬃciency. Better matched organizations can result in higher eﬀort and output. Hence,
diversity is not only good for the standard reason, namely, consumers get more choice, but
also in enhancing productive eﬃciency.
4.3 Funding of Mission-Oriented Organizations
A key insight of the approach taken here lies in being able to see how organizational pro-
ductivity is aﬀected by various regimes for ﬁnancing mission-oriented organizations. While a
complete treatment of fund raising lies beyond the scope of this paper, we can develop some
simple implications which hint at the issues. Suppose, following Glaeser (2002) that there is
a third group of actors (donors) who are willing to pay an amount D(x)t oﬁnance mission-
oriented activity.20 Whether the donor is a relevant player depends upon the wealth of the
agent.
Consider an organization in which the principal and agent are matched with common
mission preference α0, and ωa = ωp = ω0. C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r et h ePC is not binding for
the agent. Then, using the result in Proposition 1, the organization would provide a ﬁxed wage
of w and no bonus for high output. The cost of ﬁnancing such a mission-oriented organization
with mission α0 is therefore just w.M o r e o v e r ,t h ee ﬀort level is e∗ = ω0.
Now consider two possible cases depending on the size of the principal’s initial wealth A.
If A>w , then the analysis is unchanged and the principal does not seek donations to ﬁnance
the organization. The other case is where A<w . Now suppose that donations are given by:
D(x)=κ.e∗ (x)ωD{1 −
1
2
(αD − x)
2}
where 0 < κ ≤ 1, e∗ (x)=ω0
h
1 − 1
2 (α0 − x)
2
i
, and the payoﬀ of the donor is θD = ωD{1 −
1
2 (αD − x)
2 with ωD being his motivation. The parameter κ crudely captures how much of
the potential willingness to pay can be captured from donors. The latter takes into account
the fact that changing the mission away from α0 reduces the agent’s eﬀort. The principal will
now have to pick the mission to satisfy:
κ.e∗ (x)ωD{1 −
1
2
(αD − x)
2} ≥ A − w
20This abstracts from competition in the market for donors in which case D(·) would depend upon the x’s of
all the other mission oriented organizations in economy to whom the donor could give.
21assuming that a mission exists that satisﬁes this equation.21 Then if
κ.ω0ωD{1 −
1
2
(αD − α0)
2} >A− w
the organization will pick the mission x = α0. However if
κ.ω0ωD{1 −
1
2
(αD − α0)
2} <A− w
then there will be a need to change the mission to satisfy the donor even though the cost is
that it will reduce organizational eﬃciency. If the mission has to be suﬃciently distorted to
attract donations, then the organization may have to resort to incentive pay to increase eﬀort.
In this case, the cost of running the organization can increase and the need to chase donations
becomes more pressing. It is even possible that chasing donations becomes self-defeating.22
Two observations follow from this. First, organizations where donor and organization
preferences are more closely matched are more likely to be ﬁnancially viable and will be more
productive. Indeed, eﬃcient organization of the mission-oriented sector requires matching of
donors with principals and agents mission preferences. Second, organizations which have large
endowments (for example, the Gates Foundation) will tend to be more productive as they are
less likely to have to adjust their missions to attract donors.
The role of the donor can also give some insight into the role of public ﬁnance. Government
can play the role of donor with its mission preferences determined either by electoral concerns or
constitutional restrictions (e.g., maintaining a neutral stance with respect to religious issues).
The government may be able to provide ﬁnancial support to some private organizations but if
it does so, it might tend to distort their missions towards its preferred style of provision. But
in doing so, it can reduce productivity since agents will be less motivated as a consequence.
Indeed, when the US President George W. Bush announced the policy of federal support for
faith-based programs in 2001, some conservatives expressed concerns that involvement with the
government will cost churches intensity and integrity.23 Thus, we would expect government
21A neccessary condition for this is that κω0ωD >A− w.
22This is a short-run perspective taking the match between principals, agents and donors as ﬁxed. In the
long-run, matching principals and agents to donor preferences should serve a role to increase organizational
eﬃciency.
23See “Leap of Faith” by Jacob Weisberg, February 1, 2001, Slate (http://www.slate.msn.com).
22funded organizations on average to be less eﬃcient than those privately ﬁnanced through
endowments. However, whether they are more or less productive than those funded by private
donations is less clear given the earlier discussion.
A variety of extensions of the approach could be developed to understand how mission-
oriented organizations structure themselves to provide the best incentives for donors and man-
agers. Donors are more likely to support mission-oriented organizations when they believe that
they will deliver their preferred mission. This will require a credible mission statement and
high eﬀort from a motivated staﬀ. In practice credibility may be an issue if the activities of the
organization are hard to monitor. Clearly, the non-proﬁt mandate which is frequently adopted
by many mission-oriented organizations is one way of doing this. However, others measures to
guarantee dedication to the mission include advertising, and appointing oversight committees
such as trustees.
4.4 Incentives in Public-Sector Bureaucracies
Disquiet about traditional modes of bureaucratic organization has lead to a variety of policy
initiatives to improve productivity in the public sector. The so-called New Public Admin-
istration emphasizes the need to incentivize public bureaucracies and to empower consumers
of public services.24 Relatedly, Osborne and Gaebler (1993) describe a new model of public
administration emphasizing the scope for dynamism and entrepreneurship in the public sec-
tor. Our framework suggests an intellectual underpinning for these approaches. However, by
focussing on mission-orientation, which is also a central theme of Wilson (1989), we emphasize
the fundamental diﬀerences between incentive issues in the public sector and those that arise
in standard private organizations.
The results developed here give some insight into how to oﬀer incentives for bureaucrats
when there is a competitive labor market. Our framework implies that public sector incentives
are likely to be more low-powered because it specializes in mission-oriented production. It
therefore complements existing explanations based on multi-tasking and multiple principals
for why we would expect public sector incentives to be lower powered than private sector
incentives (Dixit, 2002). It provides a particularly clean demonstration of this as the production
technology is assumed to be identical in all sectors.
24See Barzelay (2001) for background discussion.
23In a public bureaucracy, we might think of the principal’s type being chosen by an electoral
process. The productivity of the bureaucracy will change endogenously if there is a change in
the mission if the principal is replaced. Incumbent agents who were matched to the outgoing
principal will resist eﬀorts to change the mission by the new principal. To the extent the mission
is changed, the organizational productivity (reﬂecting equilibrium eﬀort choices by agents)
will fall, other things being equal. Organizations without selection on mission, such as proﬁt-
oriented ﬁrms, will not face this demoralizing eﬀect. This provides a possible underpinning
for the diﬃculty in re-organizing public-sector bureaucracies and a decline in morale during
the process of transition. Over time, as the matching process adjusts to the new mission, this
eﬀect can be undone and so we might expect the short and long-run responses to change to
be rather diﬀerent. As Wilson (1989, p. 64) remarks, in the context of resistance to change in
bureaucracies by incumbent employees, “..one strategy for changing an organization is to induce
it to recruit a professional cadre whose values are congenial to those desiring the change.” This
suggests a potentially eﬃciency-enhancing role for politicized bureaucracies where the agents
change with changes in political preferences.
The approach also gives some insight into how changes in private sector productivity neces-
sitate changes in public sector incentives. Changes in productivity that aﬀect both sectors in
t h es a m ew a yw i l lh a v ean e u t r a le ﬀect. However, unbalanced productivity changes that aﬀect
one sector only may have implications for optimal contracts. To see this, consider an exogenous
change in π. Suppose that this is a situation of full employment as described in Proposition 3.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r et h ev o l u n t a r yp a r t i c i p a t i o ni s constraint is not binding public and private
incentives are unhinged. However, eventually increases in private-sector productivity (π)w i l l
have a bite on public-sector incentives and without some concomitant increase in ωa and ωp,
incentives will become higher-powered. In the unemployment case described in Proposition 4,
private-sector productivity does not aﬀect public-sector productivity. Hence, we would expect
issues concerning the interaction between public and private pay to arise predominantly in
tight labor markets.
Putting these arguments together, the model casts light on why the arguments of the New
Public Management to promoting incentives in the public sector can become popular, as it
did in countries like New Zealand and the U.K. in the 1980s. The U.K. experienced a fall in
ωp under the Prime Ministership of Margaret Thatcher. But with a slack labour market there
24was little consequence for public sector incentives even though it signalled a relative fall in
the desire for some mission-oriented activity in the public sector. However, in the 1990s with
a return to full employment and rising π the situation changed, causing the public sector to
increasingly resort to schemes that mimic private sector incentives.
Another aspect of organizational change in the public sector has been moves to empower
beneﬁciaries of public programs. Examples include attempts to involve parents in the decision-
making process of schools and patients in that of the public health system. This is based
on the view that public organizations work better when members of their client group get
representation and can help to shape the mission of the organization. The model developed here
suggests that this works well provided that teachers and parents share similar educational goals.
Otherwise, attempts by parents to intervene will simply increase mission conﬂict which can
reduce the eﬃciency of organizations. Again, we might expect signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
short and long run responses when matching is endogenous.
4.5 Corruption
We have so far emphasized agent motivation of a non-pecuniary variety. However, there are
cases where agents are motivated due to the attenuation of the principal’s property rights —
they can steal the output of the project. We show that allowing agent motivation through this
channel does not typically lead to improvements in organizational eﬃciency.
To see this, suppose that all motivated principals and agents are identical with θa = µR
and θp = π − R, where R is the amount that the agent “steals” from the principal. The cost
of stealing is parametrized by µ ≤ 1. Assume for simplicity that the agent’s outside option is
zero.
Just as above, the agent is motivated as he gets an independent payoﬀ from putting in
eﬀort. However, the fact that this is a monetary payoﬀ that comes at the expense of the
principal is important and completely alters the thrust of the results. To see, we derive the
optimal incentive contract in this case. It is easy to check that the optimal incentive scheme
is now:
(b∗,w ∗)=
µ
π − (1 + µ)R
2
,w
¶
.
25The corresponding eﬀort level is
e∗ = b∗ + µR =
π − (1 − µ)R
2
.
The expected payoﬀs of the principal, and the agent are vp = 1
4(π − R(1 − µ))2 − w and
va = 1
8(π − R(1 − µ))2 + w.25
Therefore, so long as µ<1, both the principal and agent are worse oﬀ because of corruption.
Also, the productivity of the organization is decreasing in R in this case. This is because the
joint surplus is smaller when the agent steals as the beneﬁt to the agent is smaller than the cost
to the principal. The agent would ideally wish to commit not to steal. Interestingly, for given
R, the productivity of the organization as well as the payoﬀs of the principal and the agent are
all increasing in the eﬃciency of the stealing technology, i.e., µ. When µ = 1, the fact that the
agent steals has no impact on incentives. The principal simply adjusts the bonus payment of
the agent to oﬀset any stealing by him. In this case, the eﬀect of stealing is irrelevant.
This example emphasizes the importance of the fact that agent motivation must come from
value-enhancing activities, i.e. those that raise the joint surplus of the principal and agent.
Agent motivation through transfers does not enhance eﬃciency and strictly reduces it when
the transfer technology is ineﬃcient.
4.6 Incentives to Innovate
A common complaint about the public sector is that it is conservative and lacks the will to
innovate. Religious organizations, advocacy groups, and NGOs are often accused of being rigid
in their views and approaches. Our model reveals a fundamental sense in which this will be
the case in mission-driven organizations with motivated agents. This is because innovations
are likely to generate a conﬂict of interest in mission-driven organizations. In contrast, in
proﬁt-driven organizations any innovation that raises proﬁts (π in terms of our model) will not
be resisted by anybody.26
25Since the agent gets a monetary payoﬀ from the project, the limited liability constraint is partly relaxed
and it is possible to have b
∗ < 0a sl o n ga sb ≥− µR. However, as can be seen from the expression for eﬀort, b
will never be set equal to −µR.
26We are considering innovations that increase joint surplus (which equals proﬁts for proﬁt-driven organi-
zations) without any changes in the underlying technology. In contrast, even in proﬁt-driven organizations,
innovations that change the relative importance of various factors of production, or the nature of the agency
26Suppose then that there is an innovation δ ∈ {0,1} which can be costlessly implemented.
Let
n
θ
p
k (aj,x,δ),θa
j (pk,x,δ)
o
be the payoﬀs of the principal and agent as a function of the
innovation.
First, consider the proﬁt-oriented sector of the economy and suppose that θ
p
M+1 (aj,x,1) =
π1 > θ
p
M+1 (aj,x,0) = π0, with the payoﬀ of the agent (who is always unmotivated in this
sector) unaﬀected. In this case, the principal and the agent both prefer to implement the
innovation if it raises the principal’s payoﬀ.27
Now consider an innovation in the mission-oriented sector. Suppose that the principal and
agent are perfectly matched and let (ωp (δ),ωa (δ)) be the principal’s and agent’s motivations
as a function of the innovation. We now consider the conditions under which either will
support the innovation.
Suppose that ωa(δ) > ωp (δ)f o rδ ∈ {0,1}. Then the principal will wish to innovate if
and only if
ωa (1)ωp (1) > ωa (0)ωp (0)
while the agent desires the innovation if and only if
ωa (1) > ωa (0).
From a joint surplus-maximizing point of view the innovation is desirable if and only:
S (1) >S(0)
where S (δ)=ωa (δ)+ωp (δ). Clearly if ωa (1) > ωa (0) and ωp(1) > ωp(0) then the innovation
is desirable on all three grounds. It is clear that if the innovation reduces either ωa (δ)o rωp (δ),
then either the principal or the agent may be opposed to it even if it raises joint surplus.
A b o v ew ea s s u m e dn ot r a n s f e r s .G i v e nt h ea s s u m p t i o no fl i m i t e dw e a l t ho nt h ep a r to ft h e
agent, transfers from the agent to the principal are not feasible, although transfers from the
principal to the agent are possible. Still, the general point that the innovations are less likely to
be implemented in mission-oriented organizations than in proﬁt-oriented organizations holds.
problem, may generate conﬂicts of interest.
27If the voluntary participation constraint is not binding, both would strictly prefer the innovation. Otherwise,
the principal would be strictly better oﬀ, but the agent will be indiﬀerent.
275 Concluding Comments
This paper studies competition and incentives in mission-oriented production. These ideas
apply best to the production of collective goods whether in the public or private sectors. We
have emphasized how mission design aﬀects incentives and that monetary incentives are really
only a feature of dysfunctionality within an organization. Competition plays an important
sorting role which increases the eﬃciency of mission oriented production.
While we have emphasized the virtues of mission-orientation and matching, it is important
to remember that it is equally relevant in the production of collective bads. The basic model
ﬁts terrorist groups and extremist organizations like the Klu Klux Klan. Thus the welfare
implications of our model are far from obvious even though the positive implications of incentive
structures and productive eﬃciency apply.
Our approach cuts across the conventional public-private divide largely by studying con-
tracts rather than institutions. While the study of institutions is important, it has lead to
too large a divide between the literatures on non-proﬁt ﬁrms and governments. However, an
important next step is to understand diﬀerent institutional forms. In terms of the current ap-
proach, this must lie in the way that institutions restrict or enhance contracting possibilities.
One key aspect of this is the accountability mechanism faced by principals under private and
public provision, the former being subject to oversight by trustees and the latter to electoral
discipline. Government and non-governmental organizations also diﬀer in organizational scope
— government is typically part of a larger multi-service provider. These are important issues
for future study.
The model also provides a framework for studying why organizations may eschew the proﬁt
motive. For example, if the mission choice is not perfectly contractible, non-proﬁt status may
be one way for the principle to credibly commit not to change the mission ex post as it eﬀectively
reduces the power of the principal to act as a residual claimant (see Besley and Ghatak (2003)).
This can be a good idea in our model if as a consequence agent motivation increases. Another
aspect of limiting the proﬁt motive is socially responsible business practices. Our model suggests
that this can increase productivity within ﬁrms if it increases agent motivation.28 Thus, socially
responsible ﬁrms can also be more productive.
28Alternatively, if the types of principals or agents are unobservable, these measures can be good signalling
or screening devices.
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6A p p e n d i x A : P r o o f s
To prove Proposition 1, we proceed by proving two useful Lemmas. Assume a given value
of x and deﬁne αjk =m a x {αj,αk} and αjk ≡ min{αj,αk}. Assumption 2 guarantees that
θa
jk(x) > 0a n dθ
p
kj (x) > 0 for all x ∈ [αjk,αjk]. Let ∆jk = ∆(pk,a j). Substituting for e using
the ICC, we can rewrite the optimal contracting problem in section 3.1 as:
max
{b,w}
v
p
k =
³
b + θa
jk(x)
´³
θ
p
kj(x) − b
´
− w
subject to:
w ≥ w
va
j =
1
2
³
b + θa
jk(x)
´2
+ w ≥ u(aj).
This modiﬁed optimization problem involves two choice variables, b and w, and two constraints,
the LLC and the PC. The objective function v
p
k i sc o n c a v ea n dt h ec o n s t r a i n t sa r ec o n v e x .
Now we are ready to prove:
Lemma 1: Under an optimal incentive contract at least one of the participation and the limited
liability constraints will bind.
Proof : Suppose both constraints do not bind. As the PC does not bind, the principal can
simply maximize his payoﬀ with respect to b which yields
b =m a x
(
θ
p
kj(x) − θa
jk(x)
2
,0
)
and the corresponding eﬀort level would be
e =
³
b + θa
jk(x)
´
=m a x
(
θ
p
kj(x)+θa
jk(x)
2
,θa
jk(x)
)
.
Since the PC is not binding, and by assumption w>w, the principal can reduce w by a small
amount without violating any of these two constraints. This will not aﬀect e, and yet increase
32his proﬁts. This is a contradiction and so the principal will reduce w until either the LLC or
the PC binds. QED
Lemma 2: Under an optimal incentive contract, if the limited liability constraint does not
bind, then e is at the ﬁrst-best level.
Proof :W ep r o v et h ee q u i v a l e n ts t a t e m e n t :“ I fe i sn o ta tt h eﬁrst-best level then the limited
liability constraint must bind”. As b ≤ θ
p
kj(x), eﬀo r tc a n n o te x c e e dt h eﬁrst-best level. The
remaining possibility is that e is less than the ﬁrst-best level. Suppose this is the case, i.e.,
e = b + θa
jk(x) < θ
p
kj(x)+θa
jk(x). We claim that in this case the LLC must bind. Suppose
n o t .T h a ti s ,w eh a v ea no p t i m a lc o n t r a c t( b0,l 0) such that b0 < θ
p
kj(x)a n dw0 >w . Suppose
we reduce w0 by ε and increase b0 by an amount such that the agent’s expected payoﬀ is
unchanged. Since the agent chooses eﬀort to maximize his own payoﬀ we can use the envelope
theorem to ignore the eﬀects of changes in w and b on his payoﬀ via e.T h e ndva
j = edb+dw =0 .
The eﬀect of these changes on principal’s payoﬀ is dv
p
k = de(θ
p
kj(x)−b)−(edb+dw). The second
term is zero by construction and the ﬁrst term is positive and so the principal is better of.
This is a contradiction. QED
Proof of Proposition 1: Now we are ready to characterize the optimal contract and
prove existence. There are three relevant cases:
Case 1: The PC does not bind and the agent is more motivated than the principal. We
have already established in the proof of Lemma 1 that in this case the LLC will bind and that:
b =m a x
(
θ
p
kj(x) − θa
jk(x)
2
,0
)
=0
w = w
e = b + θa
jk(x)=θa
jk(x).
The agent’s payoﬀ is
1
2
(b + θa
jk(x))2 + w =
1
2
³
θa
jk(x)
´2
+ w.
Since the PC does not bind by assumption in this case, the following must be true:
1
2
θa
jk(x)2 >u (aj) − w.
33The principal’s payoﬀ is
³
b + θa
jk(x)
´³
θ
p
kj (x) − b
´
− w = θa
jk(x)θ
p
kj (x) − w.
Case 2: The PC does not bind and the principal is more motivated than the agent. In this
case:
b =m a x
(
θ
p
kj(x) − θa
jk(x)
2
,0
)
=
θ
p
kj(x) − θa
jk(x)
2
w = w
e = b + θa
jk(x)=
θ
p
kj(x)+θa
jk(x)
2
The agent’s payoﬀ is
1
2
(b + θa
jk(x))2 + w =
1
8
(θ
p
kj (x)+θa
jk(x))2 + w.
Since the PC does not bind by assumption in this case, the following must be true:
1
8
(θ
p
kj (aj,x)+θa
jk(x))2 >u (aj) − w.
The principal’s payoﬀ is
³
b + θa
jk(x)
´³
θ
p
kj (x) − b
´
− w =
1
4
(θ
p
kj (x)+θa
jk(x))2 − w.
Case 3: The PC and the LLC binds. These constraints then uniquely pin down the two
choice variables for the principal. In particular, we get
w = w
b =
q
2(u(aj) − w) − θa
jk(x)
using which and the ICC we get
e = b + θa
jk(x)=
q
2(u(aj) − w).
As b ≤ θ
p
kj (x),e=
q
2(u(aj) − w) ≤ θ
p
kj (x)+θa
jk(x). Therefore, u(aj)−w ≤ 1
2
³
θ
p
kj (x)+θa
jk(x)
´2
.
Notice that in this case b>0 as that is equivalent to (u(aj) − w) > 1
2
³
θa
jk(x)
´2
and this must
be true because otherwise the PC would not bind and we would be in the previous case. The
payoﬀ of the agent in this case is by assumption,
va
j = u(aj).
34The principal’s payoﬀ is
v
p
k =
q
2(u(aj) − w)
µ
θ
p
kj (x)+θa
jk(x) −
q
2(u(aj) − w)
¶
− w.
Since by assumption u(aj) ≤ va
jk,v
p
k ≥ 0.
The other remaining possibility is that the PC binds but the LLC does not bind. By
Lemma 2 we know that in this case w ≥ w,b= θ
p
kj (x)a n de = θa
jk(x)+θ
p
kj (x)w h i c hi st h e
ﬁrst-best level. From the PC of the agent, va
j = 1
2
³
θ
p
kj (x)+θa
jk(x)
´2
+w = u(aj). In this case
the principal’s payoﬀ is v
p
k = −w and so it is ruled out by the assumption that contracts are
feasible, and must ensure a non-negative payoﬀ for the principal.
We now characterize the optimal choice of x. To economize on notation, let θp(x)=θ
p
kj(x),
θa(x)=θa
jk(x) for this section.Also, the ﬁrst and second derivatives of these functions with
respect to x are denoted by θ0
l(x)a n d θ00
l (x)w i t hl = p,a. Let ˆ θ(x)=m a x{θa(x),θp (x)} +
θa(x). From the above analysis, the principal’s payoﬀ under the optimal contract is:
v
p
k =

       
       
θa(x)θp(x) − w for θp(x) < θa(x) and u(aj) − w < 1
8
n
ˆ θ(x)
o2
(θa(x)+θp(x))2
4 − w, for θp(x) ≥ θa(x) and u(aj) − w < 1
8
n
ˆ θ(x)
o2
q
2(u(aj) − w)((θa(x)+θp(x))
−
q
2(u(aj) − w)) − w,
for 1
8
n
ˆ θ(x)
o2
≤ u(aj) − w ≤ va
jk.
Observe that a value of x that exceeds α0 or is less than α1 will never be chosen since
it is dominated by choosing x = αk or x = αj. First consider choosing x to maximize
θa(x)θp (x) subject to the constraint θa(x) ≥ θp (x). Note that θ0
p(x)=−ωp(x − αk)a n d
θ0
a (x)=−ωa(x−αj)a n d ,θ00
p(x)=−ωp and θ00
a(x)=−ωa. The ﬁrst derivative of θa(x)θp (x)i s
θa(x)θ0
p(x)+θ0
a (x)θp(x) and the second derivative is
³
θ00
a(x)θp(x)+θ00
p(x)θa(x)
´
+2θ0
a(x)θ0
p(x).
C l e a r l yt h et e r mw i t h i np a r e n t h e s e si sn e g a t i v e . T h es e c o n dt e r mi se q u a lt o2 ωaωp(x −
αk)(x − αj) which is negative for x ∈ [αjk,αjk]. Therefore θa(x)θp (x) is globally concave and
the ﬁrst-order condition characterizes the global maxima. The ﬁrst-order condition is, upon
simpliﬁcation,
2x − (αj + αk)=
1
2
(x − αj)(x − αk){2x − (αj + αk)}.
One root can be solved upon inspection, namely x0 =
αj+αk
2 . It is easy to see that if x 6=
αj+αk
2
then the other two roots are solutions to 1
2(x−αj)(x−αk) = 1. But it can be readily veriﬁed
that real-valued roots of this equation must lie outside the interval [αjk,αjk]a n ds oc a nb e
35ignored. Let αjk = αj and αjk = αk without loss of generality. Evaluated at x0 =
αj+αk
2 ,
θa = ωa
³
1 − 1
842
jk
´
and θp = ωp
³
1 − 1
842
jk
´
. As θa > θp for ωa > ωp, the constraint θa ≥ θp
does not bind and this concludes the proof of the ﬁrst-part of the claim.
Next consider choosing x to maximize 1
4 (θa(x)+θp(x))
2 − w subject to the constraint
θp(x) ≥ θa(x). Notice that θa(x)+θp(x) is a concave function and that attains its global
maximum at x1 = δaαj +(1−δa)αk where δa ≡ ωa
ωa+ωp. The ﬁrst derivative of (θa(x)+θp(x))
2
is 2(θa(x)+θp(x))
³
θ0
a(x)+θ0
p(x)
´
= −2(θa + θp){ωp(x − αk)+ωa(x − αj)}. The unique
critical point of 1
4 (θa(x)+θp(x))
2 − w is therefore x1.Once again, let αjk = αj and αjk = αk
without loss of generality. Notice that the derivative is strictly positive for all x ∈ [αj,x 1)
and strictly negative for all x ∈ (x1,αk]. Therefore, the function (θa(x)+θp(x))
2 and aﬃne
transformations of it are pseudo-concave, and so the function attains a global maximum at x =
x1 (see Simon and Blume, 1994, p. 527-28). Evaluated at x1, θa = ωa
n
1 − 1
2(1 − δa)242
jk
o
and θp = ωp
n
1 − 1
2δa
242
jk
o
. If ωp > ωa, 1 − δa > δa and so θp > θa at the optimum. If
ωa = ωp = ω,x 0 = x1 and so θa = θp = ω
³
1 − 1
842
jk
´
at the optimum. Finally, if the
principal maximizes
q
2(u(aj) − w)
³
(θa(x)+θp(x)) −
q
2(u(aj) − w)
´
−w, that is equivalent
to maximizing θa(x)+θp(x), which is a globally concave function with a unique maximum at
x1.This concludes the proof of the second part of the claim.
Finally, we must check that the optimal contract exists. The principal’s expected payoﬀ
when u(aj)=0i sθa
jk(x)θ
p
kj (x) − w. If ωa > ωp, substituting the expression for x∗
jk we get
v
p
k = ωaωp
³
1 − 1
842
jk
´2
− w. By Assumption 1, 42
jk < 2a n ds ov
p
k > 0 by Assumption 3.
Similarly, if ωa ≤ ωp, v
p
k =
¡
θa
jk(x∗
jk)+θ
p
kj(x)
¢2
4 − w = 1
4 (ωa + ωp)
2
·
1 − 1
2
ωaωp
(ωa+ωp)242
jk
¸2
− w. As
1
4 (ωa + ωp)
2 ≥ ωaωp for all real values of ωa and ωp (with the equality holding only when
ωa = ωp), and by Assumption 1, 42
jk < 2,v
p
k > 1
4 (ωa + ωp)
2
³
3
4
´2
− w w h i c hi nt u r ni s
positive by Assumption 3. In both the cases above the agent receives a strictly positive payoﬀ
1
8
n
ˆ θjk
³
x∗
jk
´o2
+ w even though u(aj)=0 . On the other extreme, if the principal’s expected
payoﬀ is set to zero, the agent’s expected payoﬀ under the optimal contract is 1
2
³
e∗
jk
´2
+ w
where e∗
jk =
θa
jk(x∗
jk)+θ
p
kj(x)+
p
θa
jk(x∗
jk)+θ
p
kj(x)−4w
2 .29 The agent’s payoﬀ va
jk is a strictly positive
real number if
³
θa
jk(x∗
jk)+θ
p
kj (x)
´2
> 4w which is indeed the case given Assumption 3 as
argued above. For u(aj) ≥ 1
8
n
ˆ θjk
³
x∗
jk
´o2
+ w, the PC binds and the principal’s payoﬀ
29There is a second smaller root which is ignored using the Pareto-criterion.
36is a continuous and decreasing function of u(aj), and so an optimal contract exists for all
u(aj) ≤ va
jk.QED.
Proof of Corollary 1: In this case, θ
p
M+1j = π > θa
jM+1 =0f o ra l lj =1 ,2,..,M +1 .
As a result Proposition 1 can be readily modiﬁed to characterize the optimal contract in this
case. The only concern is to ensure that the optimal contract exists. The principal’s expected
payoﬀ when u(aj)=0i s 1
4π2 − w and by Assumption 1 this is positive. Also, in this case
the agent receives a payoﬀ of 1
8π2 + w. Consider the case where the principal receives a
zero expected payoﬀ,i . e . ,
q
2(u(aj) − w)
³
π −
q
2(u(aj) − w)
´
− w =0 , or u(aj)=va
jM+1 =
1
8
³
π +
p
π2 − 4w
´2
+ w ≡ ˆ u which is a positive real number by Assumption 1. Therefore by
an argument similar to the one presented at the end of the proof of Proposition 1, an optimal
contract exists for all u(aj) ≤ va
jM+1.QED.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let Γ(∆)=ωa
n
1 − 1
2(1 − δa)242
o
+ ωp
n
1 − 1
2δa
242
o
and
Λ(∆)=m a x
n
Γ(∆)
2 ,ωa
³
1 − 1
842
´o
. Both of these are decreasing functions of ∆.D e ﬁne:
S (∆,z)=

   
   
ωaωp
³
1 − 1
842
´2
− w for ωp < ωa and z − w < 1
2 {Λ(∆)}
2
{Γ(∆)}
2
4 − w, for ωp ≥ ωa and z − w < 1
2 {Λ(∆)}
2
p
2(z − w)(Γ(∆) −
p
2(z − w)) − w, for 1
2 {Λ(∆)}
2 ≤ z − w ≤ va
jk
to be the payoﬀ of to a motivated principal when the congruence between his and his agent’s
preferences is ∆ and the agent’s reservation payoﬀ is z.O b s e r v e t h a t S (∆,z)i s( s t r i c t l y )
decreasing in ∆ and (weakly) decreasing in z.
We now demonstrate that all stable matches must be assortative.
Step 1: M = 2. Suppose that there is a stable non-assortative match with reservation payoﬀs
(z1,z 2). Then stability implies principal one would not wish to bid away agent one. This
boils down to:
S (∆12,z 2) ≥ S (0,z 1).
But this implies that z1 >z 2 since S (0,z 2) >S(∆12,z 2). Similarly, the fact that principal
two does not want to bid away agent two implies that:
S (∆21,z 1) ≥ S (0,z 2).
But by a similar argument this implies that z2 >z 1, a contradiction. Therefore there is no
stable non-assortative match where M =2 .
37Step 2: We now prove that if it is true for M = 2, then it is true for all M>2. Consider
M = 3. Since all outcomes in which two agents are not assortatively matched are unstable
by the argument in Step 1, we need only check the case where all three types of principals and
agents are not assortatively matched. Suppose for the sake of concreteness that µ(1) = 3,
µ(2) = 1 and µ(3) = 2. Now we can use the argument above to show that z1 >z 3, z2 >z 1
and z3 >z 2. But summing these inequalities yields:
z1 + z2 + z3 >z 1 + z2 + z3
which is a contradiction.
Consider now the case for M>3. Suppose that it is true for M − 1a n db e l o w . T h e n ,
we need only check the case where there is complete non-assortative matching for principals
j =1 ,..,M and agents i =1 ,...,M. But an argument analogous to that used for M =2 ,
implies that for all principals ` and agent’s k who are matched:
zk <z `.
Summing these inequalities yields
PM
i=1 zi >
PM
i=1 zi, a contradiction. Thus, if the outcome is
unstable for M − 1, then it is unstable for M. Hence, the fact that non-assortative matching
is unstable for M = 2, implies the result.QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : The stated contracts are optimal according to Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1 relative to a common reservation payoﬀ for all types of agents of:
ˆ u =
1
8
µ
π +
q
π2 − 4w
¶2
+ w.
Since n
p
M+1 >n a
M+1, there are unemployed unmotivated principals. Therefore, all employed
principals in the proﬁt-oriented sector must be earning zero proﬁts. They cannot attract
away an unmotivated agent from another unmotivated principal without earning a negative
proﬁt. Hence the matching within the unmotivated sector is stable. An agent of type aj
receives a payoﬀ of va
j =m a x
n
1
8 (ˆ ω + ωa)
2 + w, ˆ u
o
≡ ˆ va for j =1 ,2,..,M. Given that all
motivated agents earn ˆ va and S (0, ˆ va) >S(∆, ˆ va) for all ∆ > 0, matching is stable within
the motivated sector. Finally, we show that matching between the proﬁt-oriented and mission-
oriented sectors is stable. Let g(x1,x 2) ≡
p
2(x1 − w)
³
x2 −
p
2(x1 − w)
´
− w.W e c h e c k
if a principal of type pM+1 can oﬀer him the same payoﬀ or more, and still be strictly better
38oﬀ than he is in the proposed matched with an unmotivated agent. As 1
8(ˆ ω + ωa)2 + w ≥
1
8π2 + w (by Assumption 4), the PC facing the principal of type pM+1 will bind. Suppose
va
j = 1
8 (ˆ ω + ωa)
2 + w > ˆ u. Then the maximum payoﬀ that a principal of type pM+1 can earn
from an agent of type aj is g(va
j,π) <g (ˆ u,π)a sva
j > ˆ u in this case. But by construction
g(ˆ u,π) = 0 in the full-employment case and so such a move is not attractive. Similarly, if
va
j =ˆ u, the maximum payoﬀ that a principal of type pM+1 c a ne a r nf r o ma na g e n to ft y p e
aj is g(u,π) which is the same that he earns in his current match. Next we show that a
principal of type pk with k =1 ,2,..,M will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to attract an unmotivated
agent who earns ˆ u. A principal of type pk can choose his own favorite mission when matched
with an unmotivated agent. So the most he can earn is g(ˆ u,ωp) which is strictly less than
g(ˆ u,ωp + ωa) which is what he was earning before, in case the PC was binding. Notice that
g(ˆ u,ωp)=1
2
³
π +
p
π2 − 4w
´n
ωp − 1
2
³
π +
p
π2 − 4w
´o
−w ≤ 1
4ω2
p−w (since the expression
y(a − y) is maximized at y = a
2). If the PC was not binding then the principal was earning
either ωaωp − w (if ωa > ωp)o r
(ωp+ωa)2
4 − w (if ωa ≤ ωp). In the former case, as ωa > ωp,
ωaωp −w > 1
4ω2
p −w. In the latter case, 1
4ω2
p −w ≤
(ωp+ωa)2
4 − w for all ωa ≥ 0,ωp > 0. Thus,
t h ep r o p o s e dm a t c h i n gi ss t a b l ea sc l a i m e d .QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : The stated contracts are optimal contract according to Proposition
1a n dC o r o l l a r y1r e l a t i v et oac o m m o nr e s e r v a t i o np a y o ﬀ o fz e r o .T h i si sw h a tw ew o u l de x p e c t
as n
p
M+1 <n a
M+1 a n ds ot h e r ea r eu n e m p l o y e da g e n t s .T h er e s to ft h ep r o o fi ss i m i l a rt ot h a t
of Proposition 3, and is hence omitted. QED
397 Appendix B: Sorting on Motivation
Suppose now that every principal and agent has the same mission preferences. i.e. ∆(pk,a j)=
0. However, there are diﬀerences in the extent of motivation. Thus:
θ
p
kj (x)=ωkp for all aj ∈ Aa with ω1p >. . .>ωMp > ωM+1p = π
and
θa
jk(x)=



ωja for all k ≤ M with ω1a >. . .>ωMa
0i f k = M +1o rj = M +1 .
For simplicity we focus on the case where:
ωka = ωkp = ωk.
Assume also that 2ωM < π.
Let Y =m a x
n
x+y
2 ,y
o
. Then deﬁne
S (x,y,z)=

   
   
xy − w for ωp < ωa and z − w < 1
2 {Y }
2
(x+y)
2
4 − w, for ωp ≥ ωa and z − w < 1
2 {Y }
2
p
2(z − w)(x + y −
p
2(z − w)) − w, for 1
2 {Y }
2 ≤ z − w ≤ va
jk
as the surplus of a principal whose motivation is x when he employs an agent whose motivation
is y at reservation utility z. Observe that S (x,y,z)i si n c r e a s i n gi nx and y,S12 ≥ 0a n dS13 ≥ 0
for all types x,y and reservation utility z. Therefore, it satisﬁes the diﬀerentiable version of
the generalized increasing diﬀerences condition of Legros and Newman (2003, Proposition 2)
and so we know that there will be positive assortative matching in this case.30
We now construct a set of contracts which achieve this assortative matching in one special
case. Suppose that na
K+1 <n
p
K+1 (full employment). Then the following set of contracts
support the stable positive assortative matching:
30We cannot apply the results of Legros and Newman (2003) for our earlier analysis of sorting on mission-
preferences because there the sorting is “horizontal” as opposed to “vertical”, as in the present case. In par-
ticular, here all principals would prefer to have an agent with higher motivation, and the greater their own
motivation, the more they value a high motivation agent. In the earlier case it is not always the case that a
higher type principal has a higher relative valuation of a higher type agent. Suppose α1 > α2.. > αM. Then, for
example, if the two principals are types p1 and p2 and the two agents are types a2 and a3, then the generalized
increasing diﬀerences condition could fail.
40(i) w∗ (µ(aj),a j)=w for all j =1 ,...,M +1
(ii) The bonus payment in the mission-oriented sector is:
b∗ (µ(aj),a j)=m a x



ωj−1 − ωj +
q
(ωj−1 + ωj)
2 − 4w
2
,0



for all j =1 ,...,M− 1a n d
b∗ (µ(aM),a M)=m a x
(
π +
p
π2 − 4w
2
− ωM,0
)
(iii) The bonus payment in the proﬁt oriented sector is:
b∗ (µ(aM+1),a M+1)=
π +
p
π2 − 4w
2
.
It is easy to check that these are optimal contracts in the sense of Proposition 1. The reservation
payoﬀsa r e :
uj =
1
2


ωj + ωj+1 +
q
(ωj + ωj+1)
2 − 4w
2


2
+ w for j =1 ,...,M− 1
uM =
1
2
Ã
π +
p
π2 − 4w
2
!2
+ w.
In the present environment all principals would prefer to have an agent with higher motiva-
tion. Given that the generalized increasing diﬀerences condition is satisﬁed, stable allocations
involve positive assortative matching on motivation. The above set of contracts support such
an allocation because the reservation payoﬀs are such that a principal of type ωj earns zero
proﬁts if he hires an agent of type ωj−1 (and negative proﬁts if he hires an agent of type
ωj−l with l ≥ 2) but positive proﬁts if he hires an agent of the same type. In particular,
S (ω1,ω1,u 1) > 0, and for all j =2 ,..,M:
0=S (ωj,ωj−1,u j−1) <S(ωj,ωj,u j).
41